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Book Reviews
The Use Of Survey Research Findings As Legal Evidence. By Hiram S. Barksdale. New York. Printers' Ink
Publications. 1957. Pp. xxvi, 166. $6.00.
Some one has defined the social scientist as a man who
watches the other men in a room when an attractive girl
enters. Whether or not objectivity ought to be carried to
such lengths, it is certain that social researchers have for
some decades been preoccupied with the development of
techniques for systematic observation and measurement of
human behavior, from Sir Edward B. Tylor's descriptive
studies of primitive cultures in 1871 to the recent quantification of America's intimacies by the late Alfred C. Kinsey.
To those engaged in the study and use of social research,
it seems clear that its techniques are as applicable to the
field of legal controversy as they are to other areas where
they are now actively utilized - politics, business, journalism, or industrial engineering. This view may be summarized by juxtaposing two widely separated passages
from the book here reviewed: "A part of the law is written
and interpreted in such a manner that the attitudes, preferences, impressions and understanding of the consuming
public are the basis for establishing violation or compliance
with the law";' and "survey research procedures constitute
the most advanced approach and offer the most practical
and dependable means of collecting information on consumer behavior for use as legal evidence".2
Legal tradition and practice, however, have not always
been hospitable to the use of survey research as evidence.
Even in those fields of commercial law where terms such
as "ordinary purchaser" are common in both statute and
judicial opinion, the courts have been reluctant to yield
the evaluation of this ordinary purchaser's behavior to
those who regard its measurement as their everyday task.
It would be gratuitous for a layman writing in a legal
journal to offer reasons for this reluctance, but judicial
skepticism in this matter is probably no different from that
which has required the burden of proof to be assumed by
other sciences seeking their day in court: Psychiatry,
Meteorology, Calligraphy, Ballistics, Metallurgy, and a host
of others.
1 BARKSDALE, 2.

Op. cit. ibid, 140.
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Compared with some of these, survey research is a relatively recent development and its use as legal evidence is
somewhat sketchy. Those of us who have made excursions
into this field therefore welcome the appearance of this
compact new book which attempts to collect and annotate
the instances in which survey research has been offered as
evidence, both in the courts and in the administrative proceedings of quasi-judicial bodies.
This book would naturally be written either by a lawyer
who had acquired knowledge of the survey field, or by a
social researcher who made inquiry into the legal aspects of
his work. In fact, it is the latter: Hiram Barksdale is Associate Professor of Marketing at New York University and
is Assistant Technical Director of the Advertising Research
Foundation, a business-supported non-profit organization
which sponsored the publication. Although by training the
author was better prepared for the research aspects than
for the legal background of his subject, it is worth noting
that he found most of his material in legal journals rather
than in commercial or social science sources.
Barksdale reports attempts to apply survey research to
a wide variety of cases involving trade-mark confusion;
false and misleading advertising; adulterated and misbranded foods, drugs, and cosmetics; design patent infringement; antitrust litigation; change of venue; property valuations; psychological attitudes; determination of moral character adequacy of service; and copyright infringement.
While he reports some attempts to use survey research in
each of these, it is in the trade-mark cases that the bulk of
precedent has been established; other uses, for the most
part, are still largely experimental.
Following this classification of his material, Barksdale
devotes one third of the book to a chronological account of
his subject. He begins with a design patent infringement
case in 1870,8 in which the United States Supreme Court
first distinguished between testimony of expert witnesses
and observations "in the eyes of men generally". Tracing
the development of this form of evidence through changing
patterns in both law and research technique, he concludes
with the 1950's in which there is less controversy about the
admissibility of such evidence and more attention to the
quality of survey research and the consequent weight to
be attached to it.
Although the body of this book is little more than 150
pages, it includes an introduction to survey research pros Gorham

Company v. White, 14 Wall. 511, 528 (U. S. 1871).
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cedures for lawyers and a brief legal orientation for the lay
reader. Appropriately enough, there are also summary
reports of two surveys conducted by the author himself one among lawyers and the other among commercial research practitioners - to compile the experience of both
groups in working with this type of evidence. The book
concludes with some thoughtful generalizations and some
well-directed suggestions toward increasing the admissibility and utility of survey research in legal work. There
is also a useful bibliography and a list of cases.
While Barksdale may well be credited with having
adduced all of the relevant material from courts of record,
the experience of this reviewer suggests consideration of
several other aspects of the subject taken from commercial
research practice: (1) the use of survey research in hearings before local administrative bodies, such as liquor
licensing and zoning authorities; (2) the use of survey
research in drafting new legislation and establishing constitutional requirements in court; (3) the admissibility of
secondary source materials gathered through surveys, such
as Census statistics or cost-of-living figures; (4) the anonymity of the survey respondent and the confidentiality of
his individual opinion - a subject raised in a recent FCC
hearing' when survey evidence was introduced and which
evoked a statement of policy from the most recent business
meeting of the American Association for Public Opinion
Research. The critical reviewer may also wonder why
there is no attempt to illuminate the history of this form
of legal evidence by reference to other forms of evidence
which have come into being as a result of scientific advances
(such as those mentioned earlier in this review).
In summary, however, the author and his sponsors are
to be congratulated for having produced the first work in
what will undoubtedly be a crowded field in years to come.
That the book is so short is a tribute in part to the author's
discriminating use of detail, in part to the paucity of the
material in this field in which he chose to pioneer. It is
concise and readable, though marred by typographical
errors which belittle the author's scholarly aims.
Maryland readers will note reference to a decision by
Judge Chesnut in Federal Trade Commission v. National
Health Aids5 and State of Maryland v. Franklin R. YAles'The Good Music Station, Inc., Assignor and R. K. 0. Teleradio Pictures,
Inc., Assignee, Docket No. 11821, Herbert Sharfman, Examiner.
a 108F . S. 340 (D. Md., 1952).
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andro (1954),' but no acknowledgment is made of the fact
that the latter represented the first instance in American
jurisprudence in which an opinion survey was accepted as
evidence in a criminal case. Local readers will also observe
the misspelled name of our local giant in the field of statistical sampling theory and practice, William G. Cochran of
The Johns Hopkins University.
SIDNEY HOLLANDER, JR.*

Professional Ethics Of Certified Public Accountants.
By John L. Carey. New York. American Institute of
Accountants. 1956. Pp. 233. $4.00.
John L. Carey has performed a service for the accounting profession comparable to what Henry S. Drinker did
for the legal profession in 1953.1 Mr. Carey is particularly
well qualified to write the definitive text on the rules of
professional conduct for accountants since for over twentyfive years he has been the Executive Director of the American Institute of Accountants, the national organization of
certified public accountants. The fact that in the United
States within the last ten years the number of CPAs has increased from 28,000 to 54,000 and membership in the Institute from 10,000 to 28,000 attests to the vigor of the profession and indicates a phenomenal rate of growth. The ethical
concepts of the profession are developing at a similar pace.
Thus, Mr. Carey did more than just bring up to date his
earlier work on the subject, published in 1946; his current
work has an entirely new plan of organization and has been
substantially rewritten.
The book is divided into three parts. Part One outlines
the general principles of professional ethics. It discusses
in general terms the purposes of professional ethics and
those necessary attributes - competence, independence, integrity, and a professional attitude. Part Two treats the
ethical problems that arise in the three major areas of
public accounting practice, auditing, tax practice, and management services. Part Three deals with specific ethical
questions growing out of the CPA's relations with his
clients and his relations with his fellow practitioners. At
the end of the book, the sixteen "Rules of Professional
,Criminal Court of Baltimore (Warnken, J.), The Daily Record, March
16, 19.54.
* Of Sidney Hollander Associates, Marketing and Opinion Research.

IDwNKEB, LEGA

FTICS (1953).
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Conduct" adopted by the American Institute of Accountants
are set out in their entirety. These Rules and opinions interpreting them are discussed where relevant in the body
of the work, frequently at more than one place. Throughout Mr. Carey's style is easy and lucid.
The author defines professional ethics "as a mixture of
moral and practical concepts, with a sprinkling of exhortation to ideal conduct, designed to evoke 'right action' on
the part of members of the profession concerned - all reduced to rules which are intended to be enforceable, to
some extent at least, by disciplinary action" (p. 7). The
sixteen Rules of the Institute do not cover the whole field,
and Mr. Carey is not content to limit himself to a discussion of those Rules. Where the Rules are silent, he expresses his own personal opinion and the opinions of other
eminent accountants, and frequently calls attention to the
opinions of Bar Associations on analogous situations.
To any one acquainted with legal ethics, many of the
problems and solutions set out in the book have a familiar
ring. The Rules against advertising, solicitation, and feesplitting are substantially the same as those found in the
Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association. "All that these rules do is to restrain the members
of the profession from aggressive economic warfare, which
in the end would destroy the qualities which make the
profession what it is" (p. 186).
Accountants seem to have the same difficulty with the
problem of forwarding or referral fees as does the bar.
"Many CPAs believe that the practice of giving or receiving forwarding fees should be deprecated, on the ground
that it might tempt a CPA to engage as correspondent a
firm offering the largest fee, rather than the one most
competent to serve the client" (p. 182). Nevertheless, the
author indicates that the practice is not unethical, and
points out that the rate among accountants appears to be
much lower than the usual "one-third of the bill" forwarding fee prevalent among lawyers. Where there is a substantial amount of referral from one firm to another, the
rate among CPAs is reported to be as low as 15 per cent.
As to the professional attribute of integrity, the author
is not completely impractical:
"Even at the risk of losing the engagement, the CPA
should insist on a course of action which his own professional judgment tells him is the right one, although
the extent of his insistence may vary with the importance of the matter under consideration" (p. 163).
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Neither the lawyers' nor the accountants'2 rules of conduct have much to say on the question of competence. Mr.
Carey, however, feels strongly that competence is a basic
ethical obligation. He says: "....

if (a CPA) should be in-

vited to do a kind of work which is quite unfamiliar, or if
he is confronted by a problem which he fears is beyond his
capacity, he should ask himself whether, in the time available, he can equip himself for the particular task by study
and consultation, or whether in fact the matter is so far
beyond his grasp that he would serve his client better to
suggest the engagement of someone better qualified in this
field" (p. 14). Mr. Carey regretfully reports that consultation among CPAs is not yet common.
Although in most matters the ethics of the lawyer and
the CPA are similar, there are some important and interesting differences. In the Rules for CPAs, special emphasis is
placed on the obligation of independence in connection with
auditing and expressing opinions on financial statements.
"It is most important that the CPA not only shall refuse
to subordinate his judgment to that of others but that he
be independent of any self-interest which might warp his
judgment even subconsciously in reporting whether or not
the financial position and net income are fairly presented"
(p. 21). The book goes into considerable detail as to the
extent of a CPA's financial interest in a business, or his
relationships with it, that will be deemed violative of these
rules as to independence. Lawyers, for the most part, do
not have similar problems. They are primarily advocates
and rarely are expected to perform "judicial" functions
with respect to their clients' affairs.
Although it is not proper to sell a law practice,3 Mr.
Carey indicates that the purchase of a public accounting
practice is a generally accepted method of acquisition and
is not unethical.
Accountants have adopted a rule that prohibits contingent fee arrangements. 4 An exception is made as to tax
practice where the Treasury Department controls, to some
extent, contingent fees. The restrictions on lawyers are
not as strict either in terms of theory, as expressed in Canon
13 of the American Bar Association, nor in fact. Although
the dangers inherent in the contingent fee seem applicable
to both professions to the same extent, it is undoubtedly
the fact that there are more situations in the practice of
'Rule 5 of the Institute does declare that certain acts of negligence in
auditing will constitute an act "discreditable to the profession".
DRINKER, op. cit., supra, n. 1, 189.
'Rule 9 of the Institute.
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law than in accounting where the only feasible way a client
can obtain professional help is through some contingent
fee arrangement. Few poor men need the help of an
accountant.
The most striking difference between the two professions in this area exists with respect to the enforceability
of the rules of ethics. CPAs have not developed anything
comparable to disbarment proceedings. States differ widely
in their laws as to the licensing of CPAs and revocation of
licenses.' Expulsion from national and state societies, and
"social pressure" seem the principal deterrents against
violation of the accountants' ethical rules.
Lawyers will find of particular interest those sections of
the book dealing with the various points of conflict between
lawyers and CPAs. A major point of conflict exists as to
tax practice. In the last few years, a good deal of heat has
been generated on the issue of whether or not accountants
are engaged in the practice of law with respect to some of
their activities in the tax area. For Mr. Carey, the issue
boils down to the ethical proposition that neither the
accountant nor the lawyer should give service or advice
which he is not competent to give. In this book, he does
not indicate the lawyer's viewpoint and arguments on the
problem. He does, however, set out in full the "Statement
of Principles Relating to Practice in the Field of Federal
Income Taxation Promulgated by the National Conference
of Lawyers and Certified Public Accountants" approved
by representatives of both professions in 1951 (pp. 129-133).
Also presented is the statement of the Secretary of the
Treasury issued on January 30, 1956 (pp. 126-128), the
effect of which is to warn both professions that unless they
abide by the 1951 "Statement of Principles" in their practice before the Treasury Department the Treasury will
take further action. The "Statement of Principles" indicates that accountants and lawyers should collaborate
whenever both questions of law and questions of accounting are involved. But neither the Statement nor Mr. Carey
5

Md. Code (1951), Art. 75A, Sec. 4, provides that the
Governor may
revoke a license of a CPA for "sufficient cause", but as yet there are no
reported cases under this provision.
0 The "Statement of Principles" in paragraph 5 declares that it is unethical for either a CPA or a lawyer to describe himself as a "tax consultant" or a "tax expert". Md. Code (1951), Art. 75A, Sec. 10, however,
exempts "persons, firms or corporations" holding themselves out to the
public "as tax advisers" from the licensing and other requirements imposed
on CPAs. Thus, we have the strange anomaly that the only person who
can advertise himself as a "tax adviser" in Maryland Is someone who is
neither a CPA nor a lawyer.
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provide helpful guides for deciding what are questions of
law and what are questions of accounting. Since most tax
questions involve both law and accounting, some persons
suggest that the tax area be divided in some functional
way. Mr. Carey says that a CPA's activities customarily
include assistance to taxpayers in planning business transactions with a view to tax effects. Prominent members of
the bar disagree with Mr. Carey as to the propriety of
CPA's engaging in certain types of tax planning.7 Mr.
Carey makes no mention of recent cases8 that have defined
what is the "practice of law" in the tax area, cases themselves in conflict as to where the line should be drawn but
all restricting the CPA's activities in the tax field more
than CPAs are willing to concede is fair. When the federal
income tax began to have significance, CPAs took over the
bulk of the practice since lawyers were loath to take it on.
CPAs naturally resent the strict approach some lawyers
now take as to the "practice of law" on the ground that it
is an attempt to oust CPAs at this late date from an area
that became theirs by the bar's default.
There is also disagreement between the professions as
to the propriety of the joint practice of accounting and law.
Although Canon 27 of the American Bar Association has
been interpreted to prohibit a partnership between a lawyer and a CPA,9 the CPAs have not as yet issued any rules
on the subject. The bar has also indicated that it is improper for a single individual who is both a CPA and a
lawyer to practice both professions from the same office,
since it would violate the rules against advertising and
against a lawyer using any activity other than law as a
feeder for his law practice. Mr. Carey again is silent.10
Both professions agree that it is improper for a CPA
or a firm of CPAs to engage a lawyer as an employee if he
is to be used to perform legal services. Yet there seems
to be some differences of opinion between the professions
as to whether or not there are inherent dangers in every
situation where a lawyer is an employee of a CPA."
7 See Griswold, A FurtherLook: Lawyers and Accountants, 41 A. B. A. J.
1113,
1116 (1955).
8
In Re Bercu, 273 App. 524, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 209 (1948) ; Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 48 N. W. 2d 788 (1951) ; and Agran v. Shapiro, 127 Cal.
App. 2d 807, 273 P. 2d 619 (1954). These cases are discussed in Clark, Jr.,
Accountants in Treasury Practice: The Department Regulations Should
Adopt the Bercu Rule, 24 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 377 (1956).
DIKmER,op. cit., supra, n. 1, 223-228.
See Comment, The Attorney-Accountant: Ethical Problems in The Joint
Practiceof Law and Accounting, 3 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 360 (1956).
See Editorial, Employment of Lawyers by Accounting Firms, 104 J. of
Accountancy 28-30 (Sept. 1957).
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Mr. Carey's book not only provides the accounting
profession with the latest formulation of their professional
ethics but also provides new insights for all professions
seeking to clarify and improve their ethical rules and to
determine their proper roles in our complex society.
WILLIAM P. CUWNGHAM*

Desegregation And The Law. By Albert P. Blaustein
and Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr. New Brunswick. Rutgers
University Press, 1957. Pp. 333. $5.00.
"At 12:52 p.m., May 17, 1954, 335 years after the first
Negro slaves arrived in America in chains and 91 years
after the Emancipation Proclamation, Earl Warren, Chief
Justice of the United States, began reading the Supreme
Court opinion in Brown v. Board of Education"' (p. 4).
There isn't any call for this writer to comment on the
significance of that case; it is just what the authors of this
excellent book claim it to be: the most important decision
of this century. Of it Mr. Justice Jackson is supposed to
have said, "a generation of litigation"; that is a surprising
prophesy for a man not generally regarded to have been
an optimist.
After the proofs of this book had passed finally into
the hands of the printer, Governor Orval Faubus of
Arkansas promptly threw a partial roadblock in front of
the progress of adjudication and adjustment with which
part of this volume deals, but his initiative does not deprive
the book of any of its usefulness. This is the story of a
multiple litigation. It is the critical history of five lawsuits - how they got started, who was involved, what
was decided by whom on what grounds, and how the nation
reacted to the final disposition. The tale begins with the
Dred Scott decision and ends with the southern authorities
banging around in the dark trying to scare the NAACP
back to New York City.
With candor, confidence and restraint the authors, both
of whom are law teachers and one of whom is a Negro,
have combined simple constitutional history with shrewd
legal analysis to produce what surely must be at once the
most readable and the most thorough book on the subject.
But first of all, this is a careful book: carefully thought
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
1347

U. S. 483 (1954).
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out, carefully written, carefully balanced, carefully complete. That is reflected in the development of the authors'
principal argumentative thesis: that the Brown decision
was not a brazen piece of judicial legislation utterly defiant
of 60 years of established legal precedent, but rather "was
a logical extension of the standards which had been
created" (p. 127) by the Supreme Court in striking down
racial discrimination in the graduate school cases [Sweatt
v. Painter,339 U. S. 629 (1950) and McLaurin v. Board of
Regents, 339 U. S. 637 (1950)]. It is their position that
the tests adopted in those cases left little room for any
continued vigor of the "separate but equal" doctrine of
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896). Though the
authors don't mention it, this is essentially the same position taken by the unpredictable Judge Waring in his dissent from the three-judge District Court opinion in Briggs
v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529 (1951) - this was the South
Carolina case which was argued and reversed along with
Brown. He contended that one can't just say segregation
is a bad thing at the graduate level and leave it lie, but
that it is necessary to say it is bad per se, and thus the
place to throttle it is in the earliest, not the latest, stages
of education. Did the Supreme Court go that far? The
authors think so. With admirable precision they determine that the words of the Chief Justice - ". . . in the field
of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal'
has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal." - mean "that all classification by race is unconstitutional per se, and that segregation in public education
is thus merely an example of such invalidity" (p. 140).
The final chapters are devoted to a look at the methods
of compliance and non-compliance that have sprung up
in the past three and one-half years, carrying the reader
down to the end of the pre-Orvallian period. The footnotes
are carried in the appendix, which may be a nuisance to
the pedant but makes reading a good bit easier. The appendix also contains a very helpful table of all the cases cited
in the body plus the complete text of the Brown opinions.
For anyone who seriously wants to understand the legal
complex surrounding what have come to be known as the
Segregation Cases, this book is required reading. For anyone who simply likes to read an interesting book with a
legal topic, this item is a real find.
ROGER
*

Of the Maryland Bar.

D.

REDDEN*

